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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect of online social network in-
teractions on future attitudes. Specifically, we focus on how
a person’s online content and network dynamics can be used
to predict future attitudes and stances in the aftermath of
a major event. In this study, we focus on the attitudes of
US Twitter users towards Islam and Muslims subsequent to
the tragic Paris terrorist attacks that occurred on Novem-
ber 13, 2015. We quantitatively analyze 44K users’ network
interactions and historical tweets to predict their attitudes.
We provide a description of the quantitative results based
on the content (hashtags) and network interaction (retweets,
replies, and mentions). We analyze two types of data: (1) we
use post-event tweets to learn users’ stated stances towards
Muslims based on sampling methods and crowd-sourced an-
notations; and (2) we employ pre-event interactions on Twit-
ter to build a classifier to predict post-event stances. We
found that pre-event network interactions can predict some-
one‘s attitudes towards Muslims with 82% macro F-measure,
even in the absence of prior mentions of Islam, Muslims, or
related terms.
CCS Concepts
•Social and professional topics → User characteris-
tics; •Computing methodologies→Model development
and analysis; •Applied computing → Law, social and be-
havioral sciences;
Keywords
Network analysis, Twitter data analysis, Stance prediction,
Paris attacks, Homophily, Social influence
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, it has become increasingly common for a
broad range of political actors and citizens to engage with
one another on social media platforms like Twitter. This is
all part of a movement towards a more networked society
through sociopolitical technical mediums that are making
such connections easier. Through these platforms, stake-
holders are now able to engage in public discourse (e.g., po-
litical engagement) in a way that wasn’t previously achiev-
able, making it a rich target for research.
There is a rich tradition of research on social influence
and homophily in the physical world [Cialdini and Trost
1998, Turner 1991]. More recently, there has been research
examining social influence, homophily, and polarity in the
context of social media, focusing on a variety of aspects
including: utilizing social media as a tool for social influ-
ence to incite behavioral change [Korda and Itani 2013,
Laranjo et al. 2015], identifying influential users [Dubois and
Gaffney 2014], determining the homogeneity of user sub-
groups [Himelboim et al. 2013], ascertaining political lean-
ings of users [Cohen and Ruths 2013], and utilizing co-follow
relations in predicting biases and preferences [Garimella and
Weber 2014]. This paper extends this work in examining
the effect of online social network interactions — in terms
of content and network dynamics — on future attitudes and
stances in the aftermath of a major event. Specifically, we
examine two primary research questions, namely:
1. Can users’ social posts and interactions be used to pre-
dict their stance on a given topic, even if they have
never mentioned that topic?
2. What are the most predictive feature/approaches for
stance prediction?
To answer these two questions, we use people’s expressed
attitudes towards Muslims and Islam after the Paris terror-
ist attacks as a case study. The Paris attacks were carried
out by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
over multiple locations in Paris on November 13, 2015. The
attacks triggered a massive response on social media plat-
forms such as Twitter, where posts covered a range of related
subtopics, including posts showing attitudes towards Mus-
lims: either blaming them for the attacks and linking ter-
rorism to Islam, or defending them and disassociating them
from the attacks. We focus on predicting the attitudes of US
Twitter users towards Muslims subsequent to the Paris ter-
rorist attacks, based on their interactions on Twitter prior
to the attack. Specifically, we collected the Twitter profile
and timeline tweets of users who indicated a personal stance
towards Muslims after the Paris attacks, and we studied
the possibility of using these users’ interactions and tweets
prior to the attacks to predict their expected stance after the
attacks. We explored the effectiveness of three types of fea-
tures for the prediction, namely: (1) content features (i.e.,
the body of the tweets from a user); (2) profile features (i.e.,
user-declared information such as name, location, and de-
scription); and (3) network features (i.e., user interactions
with the Twitter community, through mentions, retweets,
and replies).
Our dataset contains more than 44,000 US-based users,
who posted at least one tweet about the Paris attacks within
the 50 hours following the attacks, conveying either a pos-
itive or a negative stance towards Muslims. The dataset
contains users’ profile information and network interactions,
in addition to a set of more than 12 million tweets collected
from their timelines before the attacks. We manually anno-
tated the polarity of user stance towards Muslims, and found
that 77% of users have a positive stance towards Muslims
(and 23% negative).
Our results show that a user’s pre-event network interac-
tions are more effective in predicting a positive or a nega-
tive stance than content or profile features. Also, our results
show that it is not necessary for the user to have mentioned
the topic of interest in order to predict their stance. How-
ever, if they have mentioned the topic explicitly, this sig-
nificantly boosts the accuracy of prediction (from a macro-
averaged F-score of 0.77 to 0.85).
Additionally, We provide analysis of how different features
can affect the prediction performance, and discuss the im-
plications of our findings.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 The Terrorist Attacks on Paris 2015
On the evening of 13 November 2015, several coordinated
terrorist attacks occurred simultaneously in Paris, France.
At 20:20 GMT, three suicide bombers struck near the sta-
dium where a football match between France and German
was being played. Other suicide bombings and mass shoot-
ings occurred a few minutes later at cafe´s, restaurants and
a music venue in Paris [de la Hamaide 2015, BBC 2015].
The tragic events resulted in more than 130 deaths and
368 injured people, 80–99 seriously. These attacks are con-
sidered the deadliest in France since World War II [Syeed
2015]. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)1 claimed
responsibility for the attacks [Castillo et al. 2015] as a re-
sponse to French airstrikes on its targets in Syria and Iraq.
2.2 Anti-Muslim rhetoric
Some studies in the literature refer to anti-Muslim speech
or actions as “Islamophobia”, although there is still debate
as to the exact meaning and characteristics of this phe-
nomenon. Some regard it as a type of hate speech and others
as a type of racism [Awan 2014]. In most cases, it refers to
the phenomenon of negatively representing Muslims and Is-
lam in Western media, generally based on limited or biased
1Also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
understanding of Islamic culture or historical events [Run-
nymede Trust 1997].
In this study we are interested in Islamophobia in the con-
text of our case study regarding positive or negative views
of US Twitter users towards Muslims in the aftermath of
the Paris attacks. In earlier work [Magdy et al. 2015], it was
shown that the majority (72%) of tweets from around the
world defended Muslims and Islam after the Paris attacks.
Given tweets from 58 countries, tweets defending Muslims
outnumbered tweets attacking them for all, but two coun-
tries. It was also shown that US had the largest number of
generated tweets, with 71% of the polarized tweets defend-
ing Muslims [Magdy et al. 2015]. We extend on this work
by examining the effects of social network interactions on
future attitudes, specifically for US users.
2.3 Political Polarization and Homophily
Much research has been done on predicting and estimating
a person’s political orientation [Conover et al. 2011, Cohen
and Ruths 2013, Himelboim et al. 2013, Barbera´ 2015]. Bar-
bera´ [2015] developed a “Bayesian spatial following” model
that takes into account the Twitter follow network to es-
timate the political ideology of political leaders and aver-
age citizens in several countries, including the US, the UK,
Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands. Barbera´’s model was suc-
cessful in estimating a user’s political orientation based on
information gained from his/her Twitter network, together
with their location. Subsequent work by Barbera´ expands
and validates the results of his model [Barbera´ et al. 2015].
His investigation builds on 12 political and non-political
events to better understand whether social media bear a
resemblance to an “echo chamber”, or provides a space for a
pluralist debate. The results show that during certain polit-
ical events (e.g., elections), individuals with similar political
orientation were more likely to engage in a discussion to-
gether, creating an echo chamber. The opposite is true in
the case of sudden events (e.g., terrorist attacks or sports
events) where signs of a more pluralist debate were visible
during the first hours of such events before deteriorating into
an echo chamber later on [Barbera´ et al. 2015].
Similar behavior has been observed by others [Himelboim
et al. 2013, Colleoni et al. 2014]. Golbeck and Hansen [2014]
provide a direct estimate of audience political preferences by
focusing on Twitter following relationships. Their results
compares favorably to the results of others such as Grose-
close and Milyo [2005], who do not factor in the information
gained from someone’s Twitter network (i.e., the general so-
cial media dynamics). The results of this study are aligned
with our decision to account for network characteristics in
our prediction model. Colleoni et al. [2014] utilized a com-
bination of machine learning and social network analysis to
categorize users as either Democrats or Republicans based
on the political content they shared, and then investigated
the level of homophily among these groups. Homophily
is the propensity of individuals to interact with similarly
minded individuals. Their results show varying levels of ho-
mophily between the opposing groups. Political and ide-
ological orientation has also been explored in non-Western
countries such as Egypt [Weber et al. 2013, Borge-Holthoefer
et al. 2015]. Our approach builds on previous work and ex-
amines the effect of both network and content features on
prediction.
2.4 Consistency of Orientation
In terms of opinion shifts during polarizing events, Borge-
Holthoefer et al. [2015] provide insights and empirical evi-
dence from the 2013 military coup in Egypt through the ex-
amination of tweets from two opposite perspectives, namely:
secular vs. Islamist, and pro-military vs. anti-military inter-
vention. The results of their study show little evidence of
ideological or opinion shifts even after violent events. How-
ever, they observe changes in tweet volume between different
camps in response to events. This is consistent with oﬄine
research conducted by Chenoweth and Stephan [2011] where
they examined dozens of civil conflicts around the world.
Also, the tracking of political polarization in the US be-
tween conservatives, liberals, and moderates has shown that
the relative percentage of the different groups has changed
by less than 2% since the 1970’s to the 2000’s [Dalton 2013]
(ch. 6). Such consistency enables us to assume that Twitter
users would have stable opinions over a span of at least a
few months.
2.5 Stance Prediction
Our work can also be framed as an instance of stance
detection, whereby the opinions of an individual on a spe-
cific topic are identified (as opposed to general political ori-
entation), including congressional debates [Thomas et al.
2006, Burfoot et al. 2011], online forums [Anand et al. 2011,
Walker et al. 2012, Sridhar et al. 2014] and student essays
[Faulkner 2014]. Twitter is a very attractive source of data
for the study of stance taking, due to the large volume of
users and tendency for users to express opinions on a broad
range of topics in real-time. This attractiveness, though,
comes with its own challenges, as tweets are short and con-
tain misspellings, informal language, and slang [Baldwin
et al. 2013]. These challenges make the stance detection
task over Twitter data much more difficult than is the case
for conventional documents and speeches.
The simplest approach to stance detection is to use po-
larity lexicons such as SentiWordNet [Esuli and Sebastiani
2006] to identify the ratio of positive and negative terms
in a document. Lexicon-based approaches fail to adopt to
the dynamic and noisy nature of Twitter, and are generally
outperformed by supervised stance detection models [Pang
and Lee 2008]. Supervised models, on the other hand, re-
quire manually-annotated documents, making them costly
and time-consuming to develop. Most work on Twitter
stance detection has made use of a small number of labeled
samples and tried to use different sources of information
such as follower graphs [Speriosu et al. 2011] and retweets
[Wong et al. 2013, Rajadesingan and Liu 2014]. Given our
manually-annotated data, we use a supervised model and
utilize both content (e.g., text and hashtags) and network
features (e.g., retweets and mentions) as candidate predic-
tors of user stances toward Islam.
2.6 Lifestyle Politics and Recommendations
An emerging area of research is targeted at predicting and
explaining correlations between political views and personal
preferences in such things as food, sports, and music. The
paper “Why Do Liberals Drink Lattes?” by DellaPosta et
al. [2015] is one example of such research. Such correlations
seem to arise as a result of homophily and social influence
within echo-chambers [DellaPosta et al. 2015]. One method
for discovering these correlations employs co-following rela-
tionships on Twitter [Garimella and Weber 2014], and can
be used to recommend music to users [Weber and Garimella
2014]. Using this method, Garimella and Weber [2014] have
shown that conservatives are more likely to listen to the
country singer Kenny Chesney, while liberals are more likely
to listen to Lady Gaga. In this work we observe such corre-
lations, but they are discovered using content analysis and
mention/retweet relations.
3. POST-ATTACK DATA COLLECTION
3.1 Streaming Tweets on the Attacks
In the hours immediately after the Paris attacks, the trend-
ing topics on Twitter mostly referred to the attacks, express-
ing sympathy for the victims. We used these trending topics
to formulate a set of terms for streaming tweets using the
Twitter REST API. We also used general terms referring
to terrorism and Islam, which were hot topics at that time.
We continuously collected tweets between 5:26 AM (GMT)
(roughly 7 hours after the attacks) on November 14 and
7:13 AM (GMT) on November 16 (approximately 50 hours
in total). The terms we used for collecting our tweets were:
Paris, France, PorteOuverte, ParisAttacks, AttaquesParis,
pray4Paris, prayers4Paris, terrorist , terrorism, terrorists,
Muslims, Islam, Muslim, Islamic. In total we collected 8.36
million tweets. Since we were using the public API, the re-
sults were down-sampled and subject to preset limits. How-
ever, since we were searching using focused keywords, we are
confident of having captured a substantial proportion (if not
the majority) of on-topic tweets. On average, we collected
140k to 175k tweets per hour. Subsequent to collection,
we checked the counts of the terms we used for the search
in Topsy,2 based on which we estimate that the number of
tweets that matched our search terms was slightly higher
than 12 million. Also, since we were using mostly English
words/hashtags and a few French ones, we expected to be
collecting mostly English tweets, with some French tweets.
However, as the primary term, Paris, is language indepen-
dent for most languages use Latin alphabet, in practice, we
were able to retrieve data for a large number of languages.
An open-source language identification system was then
applied to each of the tweets to understand the distribution
of languages in our collection.3 Figure 1 shows the language
distribution of our tweet collection. As shown, the majority
of the tweets (64%) are in English, which is expected since
English is the predominant language on Twitter and peo-
ple tend to comment on high-impact global events in high-
density languages. The second language was French, the lan-
guage used at the location of the attacks. Surprisingly, the
third language was Arabic, though all of the keywords used
for crawling were based on the Latin alphabet. The cause for
this was that Arabs were commenting on the topic in their
own language and adding English hashtags to make their
tweets discoverable. To keep our analysis focused, we were
interested exclusively in English tweets originating from the
US, which is the country with the highest number of tweets
in our collection. Thus, we excluded all non-English tweets.
In Section 3.4 we discuss how we filtered the tweets by coun-
try.
2http://topsy.com/ (currently unavailable)
3https://github.com/shuyo/language-detection
Positive Negative
#MuslimsAreNotTerrorist (34,925) #IslamIsTheProblem (3,154)
#MuslimAreNotTerrorist (17,759) #RadicalIslam (1,618)
#NotInMyName (4,728) #StopIslam (1,598)
#MuslimsStandWithParis (1,228) #BanIslam (460)
#MuslimsAreNotTerrorists (1,106) #StopIslamicImmigration (333)
#ThisisNotIslam (781) #IslamIsEvil (290)
#NothingToDoWithIslam (619) #IslamAttacksParis (280)
#ISISareNotMuslim (316) #ImpeachTheMuslim (215)
#ExtremistsAreNotMuslim (306) #KillAllMuslims (206)
#ISISisNotIslam (243) #DeportAllMuslims (186)
Table 1: Examples of the top hashtags that refer to positive and negative attitudes towards Muslims. The
frequency of each hashtag in the data is provided in parentheses
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Figure 1: Language distribution of the tweet collec-
tion (based on ISO-639-2 language codes)
3.2 Identifying Tweets on Islam
To identify tweets about Islam and Muslims, we filtered
the tweets using terms that refer to Islam, such as Islam,
Muslim, Muslims, Islamic, and Islamist . Out of the 8.36
million tweets, we extracted 753,476 English tweets men-
tioning something about Islam. This constitutes 14% of the
collected English tweets, which shows that reactions to Mus-
lims after the attacks was one of the most popular topics.
3.3 Sampling and Annotation of Tweets
The number of tweets pertaining to Muslims was too large
to be fully manually annotated. In order to determine the
attitude expressed in the tweets, we sampled the data col-
lection by getting a representative sample of tweets. We
used a sample size calculator4 to calculate the sample size
that would lead to an estimation of the attitude distribution
with error less than ±2.5% (confidence interval = 2.5%) and
a confidence level of 95%. We then selected a set of tweets
of this size — namely 1,534 tweets — at random from the
full collection, for manual annotation.
For the manual annotation, we submitted the sampled
tweets to CrowdFlower.5 We asked annotators to label each
4http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm
5http://www.crowdflower.com/
of the tweets with one of three labels:
• Defending: the tweet is defending Islam and/or Mus-
lims against any association to the attacks.
• Attacking: the tweet is attacking Islam and/or Mus-
lims as being responsible for the terrorist attacks.
• Neutral: the tweet is reporting news, not related to
the event, or talking about ISIS in specific and not
Muslims in general.
In CrowdFlower, each tweet was annotated by at least 3
annotators, and majority voting was used to select the fi-
nal label. A control set of 25 tweets was used to assess the
quality of the annotators, whereby the data from low-quality
annotators was discarded. The annotated tweet sample had
an average inter-annotator agreement of 77.7%, which is con-
sidered high for a three-way annotation task annotated by
at least three different annotators. The percentage of dis-
agreement among annotators shows that some tweets are
not straightforward to label. Usually this occurs between
neutral and one of the other attitudes.
Given that many of the tweets in our collection were actu-
ally retweets or duplicates of other tweets, we applied label
propagation to label the tweets in our collection that have
identical text to the labeled tweets. To detect duplicates
and retweets, we normalized the text of the tweets by ap-
plying case folding and by filtering out URLs, punctuation,
and user mentions. Tweets in the collection that matched
the annotated sample tweets after text normalization were
then automatically assigned the same label. This label prop-
agation process led to the labeling of 336,294 of the tweets
referring to Islam in the collection. After label propagation,
61% of the labeled tweets conveyed positive attitude towards
Muslims, 17% negative, and the rest neutral.
Table 1 provides some examples of the most frequent hash-
tags in our collection that refer to positive and negative atti-
tudes towards Muslims. As shown, the hashtags on the left
side disassociate between ISIS/terrorism and Islam, while
those on the right side mainly focus on a call to ban Mus-
lims from entering western countries, and some of them
go as far as to call for the extermination of all Muslims
(#KillAllMuslims). The volume of positive hashtags is much
larger than those with negative attitude.
3.4 Location Identification
To filter tweets by location, we used two different methods.
The first uses the user-declared location, and the second uses
the text of the tweets.
3.4.1 User-declared location
We extracted the user-declared locations to map them to
their respective countries. The location field in Twitter is
optional, so users can leave it blank. In addition, it is free
text, which means that there is no standard for declaring
the location. This renders a large portion of the declared
locations unusable, e.g., in the heart of my mom, the 3rd rock
from the son, and at my house. This is a common problem
in social media in general and in Twitter in particular, as
demonstrated in Hecht et al. [2011].
In our work, we used a semi-supervised method to map
the user-declared locations to countries, as follows:
1. A list of countries of the world and their most popular
cities were collected from Wikipedia and saved in a
database.
2. A list of the 50 states of the United States and their
abbreviations, along with the top cities in each state,
was added to the database.
3. Location strings were normalized by case folding and
removing diacritics and accents. For example, Me´xico
is normalized to mexico.
4. If the location string contains a country name, it is
mapped to the country. Otherwise, the string is searched
for in our database, and mapped to its corresponding
country in the case of a match. In the case of multiple
countries/cities existing in the location string, we use
the first-matching location.
5. All unmapped locations appearing at least 10 times
are then manually mapped to countries, where possible
(noting that there are high-frequency junk locations,
such as earth). All newly mapped locations are then
added to the database, and an additional iteration of
matching as in the previous step is applied.
With the initial application of our approach to the 336,294
tweets, we found that 125,583 contained blank user-declared
locations. In addition, 41,905 were locations of tweets la-
beled as “neutral”, which were not of much interest in our
analysis. The remaining tweets with non-blank user-declared
locations numbered 168,807 (with 76,894 unique locations).
Using the above algorithm, we managed to map 107,377 lo-
cations (42,140 unique) to countries.
3.4.2 Text-based geolocation
To expand the coverage of geolocated tweets, we further
exploit the linguistic content of the tweets. Previous re-
search has shown that the geographical bias in the use of
language can be utilized for the geolocation of documents
and social media users [Cheng et al. 2010]. Geographical
bias is evident in countries with different languages, but also
exists in the use of toponyms (e.g., city names, landmarks,
popular figures) and regional dialects (e.g., centre vs. cen-
ter). These linguistic features can be used in supervised
classification models for geolocation [Han et al. 2014].
We used the supervised text-based geolocation model of
[Rahimi et al. 2015], trained on theTwitter-World dataset
[Han et al. 2012], to geolocate the users. The dataset con-
tains geotagged tweets from around 1.3M Twitter users from
all over the world. Although the dataset is limited to English
tweets, it contains some foreign language text. The model
uses the aggregated tweets of a user, represented by a bag of
unigrams and weighted by a variant of TF-IDF weighting in
a l1 regularized logistic regression, to classify users into one
of 171 home countries. The trained model is then applied to
912,694
Tweet Collection
Collected Tweets about Islam
576,400 336,294
Unlabeled Labeled samples Labeled by propagation
41,905 116,513 107,377 70,499
neutral tweets unmapped mapped (usr) mapped (txt)
8,360,334
103,323 44,257
Rest of the world Accounts U.S. Accounts
177,876 tweets → 147,580 unique accounts
Figure 2: Summary of the tweet collection used in
this study. The first three rows show the numbers
of tweets; the final row shows the number of Twitter
accounts.
the users of the current dataset. The accuracy of the model
in predicting the home country of a user is 90% for the test
set of Twitter-World dataset.
To apply this algorithm to our data, we obtain the ag-
gregated user tweets from their timelines using the Twit-
ter API, as will be explained in the following section. We
evaluate the geolocation model over the current dataset by
comparing the predicted labels with the labels extracted
from the location field. The model correctly identifies the
home country of users with around 77% accuracy, substan-
tially lower than the accuracy of the model over the test
set of Twitter-World. The drop in accuracy can be a
result of temporal differences in topics, different geograph-
ical coverage (e.g., inclusion of new countries in the cur-
rent dataset) and linguistic bias in Twitter-World due to
the fact that all users of Twitter-World tend to geotag
their tweets. Pavalanathan and Eisenstein [2015] report that
Twitter users who geotag their tweets have demographic dif-
ferences with those who just fill their location field, which
reflects itself in their language.
We keep the top 50% of the most confident predictions
for each country, in order to increase the accuracy at the ex-
pense of coverage. We assume that all tweets from the same
user originate from the same country that is predicted by
the geolocation model. Using this method, we increase the
number of geolocated tweets from 107k to 177k. These 177k
geolocated tweets account for around 147k unique users, of
which 44k are predicted to originate from the U.S., which is
the largest number among all countries.
Figure 2 provides a breakdown of the tweet collection, and
all the steps applied to get the annotated data. The blue
portion in each row of the figure represents the tweets used
in the next stage of processing. The final set of 44k U.S. ac-
counts are the ones used in this study. Account information
and tweet timelines were collected for each of these accounts
for the prediction process described in the following section.
4. PRE-ATTACK PREDICTION
4.1 Prediction
Next, we try to use the pre-event Twitter interactions
and profile information of users to predict their post-event
stance. We use content, profile and network features from
the tweets posted by users before the Paris attacks to predict
their stance toward Muslims after the attacks. For super-
vision, we use the annotated tweet labels and extend it to
the user, based on the assumption that the stance of a user
will be consistent over time (pre- and post-attack). Prior
research has shown that the opinions of the vast majority
of people persist over time [Chenoweth and Stephan 2011,
Dalton 2013, Borge-Holthoefer et al. 2015]. Besides the ac-
tual stance prediction, we are also interested in finding out
what features strongly correlate with positive and negative
stances toward Muslims. Subsequent qualitative analysis of
these features can shed light on personal, social and politi-
cal attributes that are predictive of the stance a user would
adopt.
4.2 Pre-Attack Data Collection
The number of users with either positive or negative stance
who were geolocated in the U.S. is 44k. We used the Twit-
ter API to crawl (up to) 200 tweets for each of these users
that were posted before the attacks.6 Some of these user
accounts had so many tweets posted after the attacks that
the Twitter API did not allow us to crawl any tweets for
them before the specified attack date, since it does not al-
low retrieval of tweets outside the most recent 3,200 for a
given user. The total number of collected tweets for the 44k
users was 12,574,882 pre-attack tweets.
4.3 Prediction of Future Stances
We aggregated all pre-attack tweets for a user into a single
(meta-)document, and labeled the document with the stance
label of that user after the attacks. We used three different
groups of features:
• tweet content features: word unigrams and hashtags.
• profile features: user-declared profile information, namely
the name, profile description, and location.
• network features: user interaction activities, namely
other accounts that a user mentioned, retweeted, and
replied to.
We weighted the features by a variant of TF-IDF with
sub-linear term frequency and l2 normalization of samples.
We excluded terms that occur in less than 10 tweets. For
classification, we use a binary linear-kernel support vector
machine (SVM) with l2 regularization for stance prediction,
and 10-fold cross-validation to tune the weighting scheme
and regularization coefficient. We trained the model using
each feature individually, as well as in combination. We eval-
uate the prediction performance using precision (“P”), recall
(“R”), macro-averaged F-score (“F”), and overall accuracy.
Because it is easier to predict the stance of users who men-
tioned Muslims before the attacks compared to those who
did not, we partition the users into two groups depending
on whether they had used one of Islam or Muslim (case-
insensitive, can occur in the middle of another word) before
the attacks (11k users) or not (33k users). For each of the
6The API allows specifying tweet ID to get history tweets
of a given user posted before it.
two groups, we perform the training, evaluation and analysis
of the most salient features separately. We compare the per-
formance of each feature set with a majority-class baseline
(BL), by classifying all accounts to positive stance.
4.4 Results
Tables 2 and 3 provide the classification results for users
who expressed positive/negative stance towards Muslims prior
to or only after the Paris attacks, respectively. For those
who expressed views towards Muslims before the attacks,
content- and network-based features both yielded high pre-
cision (“P”) and high recall (“R”) in predicting their stance
after the attacks, with network-based features performing
slightly better. The results for those who expressed a posi-
tive stance are on the whole higher than for those who ex-
pressed negative views. This is due in large part to the class
imbalance (users who expressed positive views outnumbered
those who expressed negative views by approximately 3 to
2). For those who did not express views towards Muslims
prior to the attacks, content features yielded comparable
precision and lower recall compared to network features for
those who expressed positive views. However, the effective-
ness of the content based features may be attributed to the
fact that positive users outnumbered negative users by more
than 4 to 1. For those who expressed negative views only
after the attacks, content-based features yielded much lower
precision (0.58) than network features (0.79). Also, using
both content and network features together led to lower re-
sults than using the network features alone.
The results above highlight the fact that network features
that model user interactions on Twitter are the most effec-
tive for predicting a user’s stance on a given topic, even in
the absence of prior discussion of this topic. This finding
answers both our research questions about the possibility of
predicting unexpressed views, and the most effective features
to achieve that.
4.5 Analysis
Next, we were interested in understanding the underlying
features that make the two groups separable. To this end,
we interrogated the SVM classification model to identify the
most distinguishing features that the classifier used to de-
termine if a person would have positive or negative views of
Islam and Muslims post-Paris attacks. As the results show,
network level features — especially mentions and retweets
— are better predictors of stance, particularly for the neg-
ative class and for the case where users did not mention
Islam-related terms prior to the attacks.
Tables 4 and 5 show the top-mentioned/retweeted Twitter
accounts and hashtags from users who expressed negative
attitudes towards Muslims either before the attacks or only
after the attacks, along with those that are shared between
both groups. The common categories for both groups are as
follows:
• conservative media outlets such as @FoxNews, @Drudge_
Report, @theBlaze, #theFive and conservative accounts
such as @CloyDrivers, @RealJamesWood, and #TCOT
(top conservatives on Twitter). Fox News dominated
the category with: official accounts (e.g., @FoxNews and
@FoxBusiness) and Fox News presenters and shows
(e.g., @MegynKelly, @SeanHannity, and @Greta [Greta
Van Susteren]; #KellyFile, #Greta, and #Hannity).
• Presidential primaries either on the Republican side
Content Features Profile Features Network Features All
BL hashtags text All Desc. Name Loc. All mention reply retweet All Features
Accuracy 0.61 0.83 0.79 0.83 0.71 0.64 0.62 0.73 0.86 0.75 0.86 0.86 0.85
F 0.54 0.82 0.79 0.82 0.67 0.58 0.58 0.70 0.85 0.74 0.85 0.85 0.84
pos P 0.61 0.88 0.89 0.84 0.73 0.67 0.67 0.75 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.89 0.89
pos R 1.00 0.84 0.77 0.84 0.87 0.82 0.75 0.85 0.88 0.82 0.89 0.90 0.87
pos F 0.76 0.86 0.83 0.84 0.79 0.74 0.71 0.80 0.89 0.81 0.89 0.89 0.88
neg P 0.00 0.76 0.69 0.75 0.70 0.56 0.51 0.69 0.81 0.70 0.82 0.83 0.79
neg R 0.00 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.47 0.36 0.42 0.54 0.83 0.66 0.83 0.82 0.83
neg F 0.00 0.79 0.76 0.80 0.56 0.44 0.46 0.61 0.82 0.68 0.82 0.82 0.81
Table 2: U.S. users who are positive (6,599 users)/negative (4,082 users) towards Muslims before the Paris
attacks
Content Features Profile Features Network Features All
BL hashtags text All Desc. Name Loc. All mention reply retweet All Features
Accuracy 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.79 0.74 0.7 0.79 0.88 0.81 0.88 0.88 0.87
F 0.61 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.59 0.58 0.54 0.62 0.77 0.65 0.77 0.77 0.76
pos P 0.81 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.90 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.90
pos R 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.83 0.79 0.9 0.96 0.91 0.96 0.97 0.95
pos F 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.88 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.92
neg P 0.00 0.54 0.55 0.58 0.41 0.31 0.25 0.42 0.74 0.49 0.76 0.79 0.69
neg R 0.00 0.51 0.55 0.51 0.24 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.54 0.39 0.52 0.51 0.53
neg F 0.00 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.37 0.62 0.43 0.62 0.62 0.60
Table 3: U.S. users who are positive (27,457)/negative (6,119) towards Muslims from only after the Paris
attacks
(e.g., @RealDonaldTrump, @TedCruz, @MarcoRubio,
#Trump2016, #BC2DC16 [Ben Carson to DC], and #CN-
BCGopDebate) or on the Democratic side (e.g., #Why-
ImNotVotingForHillary).
• evangelical Christian preachers (e.g., @Franklin_Graham
and @JoelOsteen).
• political and foreign issues (e.g., #ISIS, #Benghazi,
#Obama)
Categories that distinguish the group who talked about Mus-
lims before the attacks are:
• pro-Israel media and accounts (e.g., @Jerusalem_Post
and @Yair_Rosenberg).
• atheists who have strong anti-religion views (e.g., @Sam-
HarrisOrg and #Atheism).
• secular Muslim activists with strong anti-Islamist views
such as @TarekFatah and @MaajidNawaz.
• strictly anti-Islam/Muslim content such as @AmyMek
and @Ayaan.
• issues relating primarily to abortion (e.g., #ProLife,
#PlannedParenthood, and #DefundPP), race relations
(#ISaluteWhitePeople and #BlueLivesMatter [refer-
ring to policemen]).
What sets apart users with strictly post-attack views are
sports-related mentions and hashtags (e.g., @ESPN, @NFL, @NHL,
#Patriots, and #Nascar) and those promoting men’s rights,
such as @MeninistTweet (counter to feminist) and @CauseW-
ereMen.
Tables 6 and 7 show the top-mentioned/retweeted Twit-
ter accounts and top-used hashtags by users who expressed
positive attitudes towards Muslims either before the attacks
or only after the attacks, along with those that are shared
between both groups. Common categories between the both
groups of users are:
• liberal media outlets (e.g., @theNation, @NewYorker,
@theDailyShow, @HuffPost, #LibCrib, and #Unite-
Blue)
• presidential primaries either on the Democratic side
(e.g., @HillaryClinton, @BernieSanders, #ImWithHer
[referring to Hillary Clinton], and #Bernie2016) or on
the Republican side (#BenCarsonWikipedia and #Ted-
Cruz)
• indicative of the US president (e.g., @BarackObama or
@POTUS [President of the US])
• social issues such as abortion (e.g., #P2), race rela-
tions (e.g., #AssaultAtSpringValleyHigh [black stu-
dent beaten by police] and #BlackLivesMatter), same
sex marriage (e.g., #LoveWins), and gun control (e.g.,
#NRA [National Rifle Assoc.])
• foreign media outlets (e.g., @AJEnglish and @theDai-
lyEdge).
Features that set apart the group who mentioned about
Muslims before the attacks are:
• Muslim academics (e.g., @Reza Aslan and @TariqRa-
madan), activists (e.g., @FreeLaddin), comedians (e.g.,
@DeanOfComedy), and artists (e.g., @ShujaRabbani)
• support for Muslims around the world (e.g., #Kunduz
[an Afghan city, where a hospital was bombed by the
US] and #Rohingya [a persecuted Muslim minority in
Myanmar]) and attacks against Muslims in the US
(e.g., #IStandWithAhmed [the student who was arrested
for making a clock] and #ChapelHillShooting [a hate
crime resulting in the death of Muslim students]).
• African American media and persons (e.g., @theRoot)
What sets apart users with strictly post-attacks views are
those pertaining to music (e.g., @ComplexMusic, @Acapella-
Vids, #EDM [electronic dance music], and #AMAS [American
Pre-attack Negative
conservative - media/tweep:
@Greta, @Drudge_Report, @SeanHannity, @BreitbartNews,
@PrisonPlanet, @DailyCaller, @theBlaze, @Ayaan, @Linda-
Suhler, @Christiec733, @CharlieDaniels
conservative - election:
@DanScavino (Trump adivsor), @WriteinTrump
atheist/anti-religion: @SamHarrisOrg, @AliAmjadRizvi
Muslim - secular:
@MaajidNawaz, @TarekFatah, @TaslimaNasreen
Israel - media/news:
@Yair_Rosenberg, @Jerusalem_Post, @coinabs
Other:
@AmyMek (Anti-Muslim tweep), @LemondeFR (French media),
@TRobinsonNewEra (UK nationalist)
Shared
conservative - media/tweep:
@FoxNews, @MegynKelly, @FoxAndFriends, @AnnCoulter,
@FoxBusiness, @NRO, @CloyDrivers, @RealJamesWoods, @Clay-
TravisBGID
conservative - election:
@RealDonaldTrump, @TedCruz, @JebBush, @MarcoRubio, @Rand-
Paul
atheist/anti-religion: @RichardDawkins
Christian: @Franklin_Graham (Evangelist)
Post-attack Negative
conservative - election: @RealBenCarson
conservative - media/tweep:
@BenShapiro, @SCrowder, @NYPost, @GregGutfeld, @Nero
issues:
@USMC (US Marine Corp - military), @MeninistTweet (men’s
rights), @CauseWereGuys (men’s rights)
Christian: @JoelOsteen (Evangelist)
media/satire: @cnbc, @IowaHawkBlog
sports:
@SportsCenter, @Yankees, @ESPNcfb, @TotalGolfMove, @MLB
(baseball), @NFL (football), @DarrenRovell, @ESPN, @NHL
(Hokey), @TimTebow (conservative commentator), @OldRowOf-
ficial (conservative tweep)
music: @country_words
Table 4: Top 40 mentioned/retweeted accounts by
users who expressed negative views towards Mus-
lims before or only after after the attack or by both
groups (“shared”)
Music Awards]). The prevalence of music and absence of
sports for this group (the opposite of what we observed in
the equivalent group with negative views) requires further
investigation. Though it may seem surprising at first, there
are indications in the literature that food, sports, and mu-
sic preferences are often correlated with political polariza-
tion [DellaPosta et al. 2015, Garimella and Weber 2014].
5. DISCUSSION
5.1 Methodology
In this work we presented a method for predicting the
stance of individuals based on their past behavior on so-
cial media, focusing in part on users who have explicitly
expressed no opinion on a particular topic in the past. The
methodology involves analyzing two types of data, namely:
(1) post interactions (tweets and network activity), in which
we are able to learn users’ stated stances towards an event,
an issue, or a group based on sampling methods and crowd-
sourced annotations; and (2) pre-interactions, which are used
Pre-attack Negative
conservative - elections:
#RNC, #AllInForJeb, #WhyImNotVotingForHillary
conservative - media: #theFive
issues:
{#ProLife, #PlannedParenthood, #DefundPP, #PPSellsBaby-
Parts, #ShoutYourAbortion} (abortion), #ObamaCare (health
care), #ISaluteWhitePeople (race relations), #BlueLives-
Matter (race relations), #Military, #NeverForget (general),
#Hamas (foreign)
music & pop culture:
#PreOrderPurpose, #Legend, #Cats, #Fallout4
sports: #MLB (Major League Baseball)
ideology: #Atheism
Shared
conservative - elections:
#Trump2016, #MakeAmericaGreatAgain, #BC2DC16 (Ben Carson
to DC), #Trump, #StandWithRand, #CNBCGopDebate
conservative - media/tweep:
#KellyFile, #Greta, #Hannity, #TCOT (Top Conservatives On
Twitter)
issues:
#MillionStudentMarch (education), #ISIS (foreign), #Beng-
hazi (political), #Obama (political)
others:
#GamerGate (online harassment), #pray, #NationalOffendA-
CollegeStudentDay, #CSLewis (author)
Post-attack Negative
conservative - media/tweep:
#PJNet (Patriot Journalist Network), #WakeUpAmerica, #CCOT
(Conservative Christian on Twitter), #Merica
conservative - elections: #GOPDebate, #CruzCrew
Christian: #IamAChristian, #Jesus
sports:
#WorldSeries, #Mets, #SEC, #NFL, #Yankees, #OneFinalTeam,
#Patriots, #Nascar, #Vols, #RollTide
issues: #ThankAVet (veterans)
other: #safespace, #TFM, #faith
Table 5: Top 40 hashtags used by users who
expressed negative views towards Muslims before
or only after after the attack or by both groups
(“shared”)
to build a classifier to predict stances which are expressed
only later. For the specific case-study in this paper, our
results show that using a user’s pre-attack network inter-
actions can predict a user’s positive or negative attitudes
towards Muslims with 90% and 79% precision, respectively,
even when they had not previously mentioned Islam, Mus-
lims, or related terms. This work extends previous research
in which only content-based analysis was used to predict fu-
ture support or opposition to an entity [Magdy et al. 2016].
Our work here suggests that network-based analysis may
often be more reliable than content-based analysis.
5.2 Homophily or Social Influence
As we can see from the results, network features — as
primarily manifested in retweets and mentions — are strong
predictors of a person’s stance on a given topic, even when
they have not mentioned that topic in their posts. For the
presented case-study, network features have a precision of
0.79 for the minority class (negative view towards Muslims)
even for users who had not mentioned Muslims previously.
The power of network features can be a result of either ho-
mophily — the propensity of individuals to interact with
Pre-attack Positive
liberal - media/tweep:
@JohnFugelsang, @TheEconomist, @TheNation, @HuffPostRe-
lig, @NewYorker, @MyDaughtersArmy, @Salon, @Libertea2012,
@WilW
liberal - election/political: @HillaryClinton, @MoveOn
Muslim - academic/activist: @RezaAslan, @TariqRamadan,
@FreeLaddin
Muslim - comedian/artist: @DeanOfComedy, @AzizAnsari,
@ShujaRabbani
pop culture/science: @UncleRush, @TedTalks
sports: @KingJames (basketball)
actors: @MattMcgorry (US), @AnupAmpkher (India)
Other:
@AJEnglish (Aljazeera), @TheRoot (African American-media),
@OhNoSheTwitnt (comedian), @BabyAnimalPics
Shared
liberal - media/tweep:
@Bipartisanism, @TheDailyShow, @BuzzFeed, @NYTimes, @LOL-
Gop
liberal - election: @BernieSanders, @SenSanders
liberal - US president: @POTUS
pop culture: @RollingStone
US-civil rights activist: @DeRay
Other:
@TheDailyEdge (foreign media), @Mark_Beech (UK actor),
@JK_Rowling (UK liberal author), @DavidKWilliams (US busi-
ness person)
Post-attack Positive
liberal - media/tweep:
@HuffingtonPost, @Maddow, @ThinkProgress, @NeilTyson,
@SarahKSilverman, @StephenKing
liberal - US president:
@WhiteHouse, @BarackObama
music/media/TV/pop culture:
@NPR, @VoxDotCom, @ComplexMusic, @FuckTyler, @JoeBudden,
@AcapellaVids, @WSHHFans, @JonBuckhouse, @ColiegeStu-
dent, @MattBellassai, @MrCocoyam, @AnnaKendrick47
US-civil rights activist: @_JonathanButler
sports: @Arsenal, @TSBible
foreign person: @DalaiLama (Bhuddist), @LoaiDeeb (tweep)
Other: @CuteEmergency
Table 6: Top 40 mentioned/retweeted accounts by
users who expressed positive views towards Mus-
lims before or only after after the attack or by both
groups (“shared”)
similarly minded individuals — or social influence — where
individual attitudes are affected by the attitudes of others.
For example, in our study we observe that individuals who
follow conservative media outlets are more likely to harbor
negative attitudes towards Muslims. Whether these indi-
viduals follow such media sources because they agree with
their stance towards Muslims, or whether they started hav-
ing anti-Muslim views because they tune to such media, is
unclear. Prior research has shown a strong tendency for ho-
mophily in social networks based, for example, on politics
or ideology. It could be that individuals coalesce, for ex-
ample, around broad political positions, but rely on others
who share the same broad position to shape their position
towards narrow topics. This requires further investigation.
5.3 Prediction
The ability to predict a person’s position (or likely posi-
tion) when the person has not stated an explicit stance has
many implications and applications, such as:
Pre-attack Positive
liberal - election:
#ImWithHer, #BenCarsonWikipedia, #Bernie2016
liberal - tweeps/media:
#GOPClownCar, #Maddow, #LibCrib, #UniteBlue, #inners,
#DemForum
issues:
#P2 (abortion), #NRA (guns), #HumanRights (human rights),
#ConcernedStudent1950 (race relations), #LBGT (gay rights)
pop culture & music:
#Emmys, #empire, #GreysAnatomy, #DoctorWho, #BackToTheFu-
ture
support for Muslims worldwide:
#Kunduz, #Rohingya, #Palestine, #Gaza
conservative:
#TedCruz (election), #BB4SP (tweep)
anti-Muslim attack: #ChapelHillShooting
general:
#peace, #news, #TacoEmojiEngine
media & humor:
#MorningJoe, #IBDEditorials, #StuffHappens
Muslim specific: #EidMubarak
Shared
anti-Muslim act: #IStandWithAhmed
issues:
#StandWithPP (abortion), #AssaultAtSpringValleyHigh (race
relations), #LoveWins (gay rights), #ActOnClimate (climate
change)
liberal - election:
#FeelTheBern, #DebateWithBernie, #IAmWithHer
Post-attack Positive
issues:
#BookBoost (education), #nanowrimo (education), #AmWrit-
ing (education), #Afghanistan (foreign), #BlackLivesMatter
(race relations), #SandraBland (race relations)
music:
#EDMA, #EDM, #EDMLifestyle, #EDMFamily, #EDMLife,
#MadeInTheAM, #AMAS, #WomenInMusic, #DJSet
pop culture:
#arrow, #theFlash, #htgawm, #supernatural, #AllMyMovies,
#StarGate, #MasterOfNone, #SuperGirl, #MockingJayPart2,
#tvd
Muslim activist: #DrLoaiDeeb, #WeSupportGNRD
general:
#business, #lrt, #leadership, #gratitude, #halloween
Table 7: Top 40 hashtags by users who expressed
positive views towards Muslims before or only after
after the attack or by both groups (“shared”)
5.3.1 Recommendation
As can be seen from the results, users who are closer to-
gether from a network standpoint may also share similar
preferences. We are able to observe this not just in terms
of positions towards an ethnic or religious group, but also
in terms of preference of religion, media outlets, and po-
tentially music and sports. Though choice of music and
political stances may seem unrelated, recent work on so-
called “lifestyle politics” suggest that such correlations are
real [DellaPosta et al. 2015] and could be used by recom-
mender systems [Weber and Garimella 2014]. Thus, network
information may aid in providing more accurate recommen-
dations to users and better targeted advertising.
5.3.2 Ascertaining unspoken views
Users may avoid expressing positions explicitly for many
reasons, such as fear of social judgment or political repres-
sion, especially under repressive regimes. As seen in our
study, predicting unexpressed positions may be possible based
not just on an individual’s network interactions but also, as
suggested by lifestyle politics research, preferences for spe-
cific music, sports, or food items. On the positive side, such
predictions may be utilized to guess how a population may
vote in elections or referenda. On the negative side, it can be
used by oppressive regimes to identify potential dissidents,
though they may not express their opposition publicly.
5.3.3 Population segmentation
As can be seen from the case-study, those who expressed
positive (or negative) views towards Muslims were not a ho-
mogeneous whole. For example, those with positive views
included, inter alia, Muslims, liberals, and civil rights ac-
tivists. The methodology that we employed provides the
ability to ascertain underlying groups that may share a com-
mon position towards an issue. The ability to discover such
groups (i.e., segment the population) can be helpful for a
variety of applications. For example, marketers may be able
to perform market segmentation. Similarly, political candi-
dates, activists, or politicians can craft targeted messages to
different constituent sub-groups.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a methodology for predict-
ing a person’s stance towards an issue, topic, or group in
response to an event and given previous activity on social
media sites. As a case study, we used the views of US Twit-
ter users towards Muslims in the wake of the Paris terrorist
attacks of Nov. 13, 2015. As shown in our work, previous
Twitter interactions — particularly network-based interac-
tions — serve as strong predictors of stance. Prediction is
possible because users tend to congregate with like minded
users online (homophily) and are influenced by the views
of others in their social network (social influence). Social
media messages and networks therefore have profound in-
fluence on political attitudes and shape national and inter-
national policy. Therefore, the relative effects of homophily
and social influence warrant further research [Colleoni et al.
2014]. Successful prediction can facilitate much interesting
research. One such area is so-called lifestyle politics, where
the objective is to discover correlations between preferences
(e.g., in music or sports) and political views. What correla-
tions exist and why they exist are interesting lines of future
work. Another area is the identification of the traits (e.g.,
political, ideological, economic, or religious) of people hold-
ing particular views. Such identification can help in areas
such as population segmentation, which would have impact
on other areas like automatic recommendation and targeted
marketing. There has been some recent work on employing
such user traits for recommendation [Weber and Garimella
2014], but this area is rather nascent and requires much fur-
ther work.
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